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SecurityAbstract Several biometric-based remote user authentication schemes using smart cards have been
proposed in the literature in order to improve the security weaknesses in user authentication system.
In 2012, An proposed an enhanced biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart
cards. It was claimed that the proposed scheme is secure against the user impersonation attack, the
server masquerading attack, the password guessing attack, and the insider attack and provides
mutual authentication between the user and the server. In this paper, we ﬁrst analyze the security
of An’s scheme and we show that this scheme has three serious security ﬂaws in the design of the
scheme: (i) ﬂaw in user’s biometric veriﬁcation during the login phase, (ii) ﬂaw in user’s password
veriﬁcation during the login and authentication phases, and (iii) ﬂaw in user’s password change
locally at any time by the user. Due to these security ﬂaws, An’s scheme cannot support mutual
authentication between the user and the server. Further, we show that An’s scheme cannot prevent
insider attack. In order to remedy the security weaknesses found in An’s scheme, we propose a new
robust and secure anonymous biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using smart
cards. Through the informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against
all possible known attacks including the attacks found in An’s scheme. The simulation results of our
scheme using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols
and Applications) tool ensure that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks. In addi-
tion, our scheme is also comparable in terms of the communication and computational overheads
194 A.K. Das, A. Goswamiwith An’s scheme and other related existing schemes. As a result, our scheme is more appropriate
for practical applications compared to other approaches.
ª 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Remote user authentication plays an important role in many
applications including e-commerce and m-commerce. Several
remote user authentication schemes and their enhancements
are proposed in the literature to improve the various security
ﬂaws in other schemes. The security of the traditional iden-
tity-based remote user authentication schemes is based on
the passwords. However, simple passwords are easy to break
by simple dictionary attacks. In order to resolve such problem,
biometric-based remote user authentications are considered for
better alternatives since such authentications are more secure
and reliable than the traditional password-based authentica-
tion schemes (Li and Hwang, 2010). The advantages of using
biometric keys (for example, ﬁngerprints, faces, irises, hand
geometry, palm-prints, etc.) are (Das, 2011a; Das and
Goswami, 2013; Li and Hwang, 2010)
 Biometric keys cannot be lost or forgotten.
 Biometric keys are extremely hard to forge or distribute.
 Biometric keys are extremely difﬁcult to copy or share.
 Biometric keys cannot be guessed easily as compared to
low-entropy passwords.
 Someone’s biometrics is not easy to break than others.
According to the existing researches, we list some important
essential requirements for evaluating a novel biometric-based
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards.
Security requirements
The following attacks should be prevented (Li and Hwang,
2010):
 SR1.Withstand masquerade attacksIn this attack, an adver-
sary may try to masquerade as a legitimate user to
communicate with a valid system or masquerade as a valid
system in order to communicate with legal users.
 SR2. Withstand replay attacksAn attacker tries to hold up
the messages between two communicating parties and then
impersonate other legal party to replay the fake messages
for further deceptions.
 SR3. Withstand man-in-the-middle attacksIn such attacks,
an attacker may intercept the messages during transmis-
sions and then can change or delete or modify the contents
of the messages delivered to the recipients.
 SR4. Withstand denial-of-service attacksIf an attacker
blocks the messages from reaching the server and the users,
the server as well as the users should know about malicious
dropping of such control messages.
 SR5. Withstand parallel session attacksIn a parallel session
attack, an attacker may start new runs of the protocol using
knowledge gathered from the initial runs of the protocol.
Messages from these new runs of the protocol are replayed
in the initial run (Pasca et al., 2008). SR6. Withstand stolen-veriﬁer attacksAn attacker must not
get/steal user’s password and other secret information from
the system.
 SR7. Withstand stolen smart card attacksThe smart card is
usually equipped with tamper-resistant device. If the smart
card of a user is lost or stolen, an attacker can still retrieve
all the sensitive information stored in the stolen smart
card’s memory using the power analysis attack (Kocher
et al., 1999; Messerges et al., 2002). Then using these
retrieved information, an attacker can derive other secret
information of the communicating parties (the user as well
as the server).
Functionality requirements
A biometric-based remote user authentication scheme
should satisfy the following functionality requirements (Li
and Hwang, 2010):
 FR1. Provide mutual authentication between two
communicating parties and after successful authentication,
a secret session key should be established between them
for future secure communication between the parties.
 FR2. Should be efﬁcient in terms of communication and
computational overheads.
 FR3. Allow users to freely choose and change the pass-
words locally without further contacting the server. Thus,
it can reduce the communication and computational
overheads, and some possible attacks between two
communicating parties over an insecure network.
 FR4. Work without storing the password and veriﬁcation
tables in the system to withstand stolen-veriﬁer attacks.
 FR5. Support without synchronized clocks when the
communicating parties are not synchronized with their
clocks.
 FR6. Provide non-repudiation because of employing
personal biometrics.
Several remote user authentication schemes using smart
cards have been proposed in the literature (An, 2012; Chou
et al., 2013; Das, 2011a,b; He et al., 2008; Khan and
Kumari, 2013; Li and Hwang, 2010, Li et al., 2011). He
et al. (2008) proposed a self-certiﬁed user authentication
scheme for next generation wireless network, which relies on
the public-key cryptosystem. In 2010, Li and Hwang proposed
an efﬁcient biometric-based remote user authentication scheme
using smart card (Li and Hwang, 2010). Though their scheme
is efﬁcient, it suffers from several security weaknesses as
pointed out in Das (2011a). Li et al. (2011) also proposed an
improvement on Li–Hwang’s scheme (Li and Hwang, 2010).
Later, Das (2011b) showed that Li et al.’s scheme (Li et al.,
2011) again fails to provide proper authentication in login
and authentication phases because there is no veriﬁcation
on user’s entered password after successful veriﬁcation of
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the same password veriﬁcation problem as in Li–Hwang’s
scheme (Li and Hwang, 2010), Li et al.’s scheme (Li et al.,
2011) fails to update the new password correctly in a user’s
smart card locally during the password change phase. Based
on assumption as used in Li–Hwang’s scheme (Li and
Hwang, 2010) that extracting secret information from
tamper-resistant smart card is as secure as passwords, in
2011 Das (2011a) proposed an effective scheme to withstand
security ﬂaws found in Li–Hwang’s scheme. However, in
2012 An (2012) showed that Das’s scheme (Das, 2011a) is
insecure when the secret information stored in the smart card
is revealed to an attacker. To withstand those security ﬂaws,
An further proposed an enhanced efﬁcient scheme. In 2013,
Chou et al. (2013) proposed an efﬁcient two-pass anonymous
identity authentication using smart card. Khan and Kumari
(2013) also proposed an improved biometrics-based remote
user authentication scheme with the user anonymity property,
which eliminates some weaknesses found in An’s scheme.
However, Khan–Kumari’s scheme uses the one-way hash
function for veriﬁcation of user’s biometrics. As pointed out
in Section 4.1, we note that Khan–Kumari’s scheme has design
ﬂaw in user’s biometric veriﬁcation during their login phase as
well as password change phase due to direct application of the
sensitive one-way hash function on the biometrics (Das, 2011a;
Li et al., 2011). As a result, Khan–Kumari’s scheme fails to
provide proper authentication. In this paper, we show that
An’s scheme (An, 2012) is still insecure, because it has several
security weaknesses and it does not protect insider attack.1.1. Our contributions
The contributions are listed below:
 We show that recently proposed An’s scheme (An, 2012)
has three serious security ﬂaws in the design of the scheme:
(i) ﬂaw in user’s biometric veriﬁcation during the login
phase, (ii) ﬂaw in user’s password veriﬁcation during the
login and authentication phases, and (iii) ﬂaw in user’s
password change locally at any time by the user.
 We further show that An’s scheme cannot prevent insider
attack.
 In order to remedy the security weaknesses found in An’s
scheme, we propose a new robust and secure scheme.
 Our scheme supports uniqueness and anonymity preserving
properties and strong replay attack protection as compared
to An’s scheme.
 Through the informal and formal security analysis, we
show that our scheme is secure against various known
attacks including the attacks found in An’s scheme.
 We simulate our scheme using the widely-accepted AVISPA
tool for the formal security veriﬁcation to ensure that our
scheme is secure against passive and active attacks.
 Our scheme is also comparable to An’s scheme and other
related existing schemes when the communication and com-
putational costs are considered during the various phases.
 Higher security along with efﬁciency of our scheme make
our scheme more appropriate for practical applications
when compared to An’s scheme and other related existing
schemes.1.2. Organization of the paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
brieﬂy review the properties of one-way hash function and
BioHashing for describing An’s scheme and our scheme, and
cryptanalysis of An’s scheme in Sections 3 and 4, respectively.
In Section 5, we propose a new robust and secure biometric-
based remote user authentication scheme, which preserves user
anonymity and uniqueness properties. In Section 6, through
the informal and formal security analysis, we show that our
scheme is secure against possible known attacks including
the attacks found in An’s scheme. The simulation results for
the formal security veriﬁcation of our scheme using the
widely-accepted AVISPA tool are provided in Section 7. In
Section 8, we compare the performance and security of our
scheme with An’s scheme and other related existing schemes.
Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
2. Mathematical preliminaries
In this section, we discuss the properties of one-way hash func-
tion and BioHashing, which are useful for describing and ana-
lyzing our scheme as well as An’s scheme.
2.1. One-way hash function
A one-way hash function h : X ¼ f0; 1g ! Y ¼ f0; 1gn takes
an arbitrary-length input x 2 X, and produces a ﬁxed-length
n-bits output hðxÞ 2 Y, called the message digest or hash value
such that from a given hash value y ¼ hðxÞ 2 Y and the given
hash function hðÞ, it is computationally infeasible to derive the
input x 2 X (Stallings, 2003). A hash function can be applied
to the ﬁngerprint of a ﬁle, a message, or other data blocks.
One of the fundamental properties of a secure one-way hash
function is that its outputs are very sensitive to a small
perturbation in inputs (Das, 2011a). The cryptographic hash
function cannot be applied straightforwardly when the input
data are with noise such as biometrics (Jain et al., 2003;
Linnartz and Tuyls, 2003; Maltoni et al., 2009; Prabhakar
et al., 2003). An example of a one-way hash function is
SHA-1 (Secure Hash Standard, 1995), which has the above
desired properties. However, National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) does not recommend SHA-1 for top
secret documents. Further, in 2011, Manuel (2011) showed
collision attacks on SHA-1. In this paper, we use SHA-2 as
the secure one-way hash function in order to achieve top
security. We use only 160-bits from the hash digest output of
SHA-2.
2.2. BioHashing
BioHashing is one-way and the BioCode generated using the
BioHashing on biometrics of a user is also as secure as a
hashed password. Jina et al. (2004) proposed a two factor
authenticator based on iterated inner products between tok-
enized pseudo-random number and the user speciﬁc ﬁngerprint
feature. Their approach produces a set of user speciﬁc com-
pact code that coined as BioHashing. Lumini and Nanni
(2007) further proposed an improvement on BioHashing.
Table 1 Notations used in this paper.
Symbol Description
Ui User i
Rj Registration center j
Sj Remote server j
IDi Ui’s identity
PWi Ui’s password
Bi Ui’s biometric template
hðÞ Secure collision-free one-way hash function
HðÞ Secure BioHashing function
Xs Secret information maintained by the server
K Secret information maintained by Ui’s
smart card
AjjB Data A concatenates with data B
A B XOR operation of A and B
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tures onto user-speciﬁc random vectors in order to generate
the BioCode and then discretizes the projection coefﬁcients
into zero or one (Chang et al., 2013). BioHashing is thus a very
useful tool for biometric veriﬁcation (Chang et al., 2013; Das
and Goswami, 2013).
2.3. Perceptual hashing
Perceptual hash functions are designated as one-way conven-
tional hash functions for multimedia contents (Perceptual
Hashing, 2013). Similar to cryptographic hash functions, they
are required to generate different hash values for different
inputs. However, the deﬁnition of difference is changed from
bitwise difference to perceptual difference in the sense that
the cryptographic hash functions generate a totally different
hash value even if the input is changed by a single bit, whereas
the robust hash functions are expected to change the hash
value only if the input is perceptually changed. For an exam-
ple, the hash value of an image and its JPEG compressed ver-
sion should be the same since they have no perceptual
difference although their bit-string representation is completely
different.
Perceptual hashes need to be robust enough to take into
account transformations or attacks on a given input and yet
be ﬂexible enough to distinguish between dissimilar ﬁles.
Such attacks can include rotation, skew, contrast adjustment
and different compression/formats. All of these challenges
make perceptual hashing an interesting ﬁeld of study in com-
puter science research. Due to security issues of the perceptual
hashing, in this paper we make use of the fuzzy extractor in
order to perform user’s biometric veriﬁcation, which is dis-
cussed in next subsection.
2.4. Key data extraction process from biometric template
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the extraction process of key
data from the biometric of a user using a fuzzy extractor.
Since the output of a conventional hash function hðÞ is sen-
sitive it may return completely different outputs even if there is
a little variation in inputs. On the other hand, biometric infor-
mation is prone to various noises during data acquisition and
the reproduction of actual biometric is hard in common prac-
tice. To avoid this kind of problem, a fuzzy extractor (Burnett
et al., 2007; Dodis et al., 2004) is used, which has the ability to
extract a uniformly random string b and a public information
par from the biometric template f with the error tolerance t. In
the reproduction process, the fuzzy extractor recovers the
original biometric data b for a noisy biometric f0 using par
and t.
Suppose thatM¼ f0; 1gv be a ﬁnite v-dimensional metric
space of biometric data points, d :MM! Zþ a distance
function, which is used to calculate the distance between two
points based on the metric chosen, l the number of bits of
the output string bi and t the error tolerance, where Z
þ is
the set of all positive integers.
Deﬁnition 1. The fuzzy extractor ðM; l; tÞ is deﬁned by the
following two algorithms: Gen: This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a biometric
information f i 2 M as input and outputs a key data
bi 2 f0; 1gl and a public reproduction parameter pari. In
other words, Genðf iÞ ¼ fbi; parig.
 Rep: This is a deterministic algorithm that takes a noisy bio-
metric information f 0i 2M and a public parameter pari
related to f i, and then it reproduces the biometric key data
bi. In other words, Repðf 0i; pariÞ ¼ bi provided that the con-
dition dðf i; f 0iÞ 6 t holds.
The detailed description of the fuzzy extractor and the
extraction procedure can be found in Burnett et al. (2007)
and Dodis et al. (2004).
3. Review of An’s scheme
In this section, we review the recently proposed An’s scheme
(An, 2012). This scheme has three phases: registration phase,
login phase, and authentication phase. However, this scheme
does not specify the procedure to changing the user’s password
locally and freely as suggested in Li–Hwang’s scheme (Li and
Hwang, 2010) and Das’s scheme (Das, 2011a). We use the
notations in Table 1 for describing An’s scheme and its
cryptanalysis.
3.1. Registration phase
In this phase, a user Ui ﬁrst needs to register to a trusted
registration center Rj before he/she is allowed to login to the
remote server Sj. This phase consists of the following steps:
 Step 1: Ui chooses his/her identity IDi, selects a password
PW i and generates a random number K which is kept secret
to him/her only. Ui then computes PW i  K. After that Ui
inputs his/her biometric information Bi (for example, ﬁnger-
print) and submits Bi  K via a speciﬁc device to Rj. Ui
sends the message hIDi; PW i  K;Bi  Ki to Rj via a secure
channel.
 Step 2: When Rj receives the information securely from Ui
in Step 1, Rj generates a secret value X s which is kept secret
to Rj only, and then computes f i ¼ hðBi  KÞ,
ri ¼ hðPW i  KÞ  f i, and ei ¼ hðIDijjX sÞ  ri.
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card and then sends the smart card to Ui via a secure chan-
nel. In addition, Ui stores the previously generated secret
number K into his/her smart card.3.2. Login phase
Suppose the user Ui wants to login to the remote server Sj.
Then the user Ui needs to perform the following steps in order
to send the login request message to Sj for authentication
purpose:
 Step 1: Ui ﬁrst inserts his/her smart card into a speciﬁc card
reader and then inputs his/her biometric Bi on the speciﬁc
device. The smart card then computes the hash value
hðBi  KÞ using the stored secret number K and veriﬁes
whether it matches with f i stored in the smart card. If so,
Ui passes the biometric veriﬁcation; otherwise, the login
process is terminated immediately.
 Step 2: Ui enters his/her identity IDi and password PW i. Ui
generates a random number Rc. The smart card then com-
putes r0i ¼ hðPW i  KÞ  f i;M1 ¼ ei  r0i;M2 ¼ M1  Rc;
M3 ¼ hðM1jjRcÞ.
 Step 3: Finally, Ui sends the login request message
hIDi;M2;M3i to Sj for authentication.
3.3. Authentication phase
In this phase, the remote server Sj authenticates Ui after receiv-
ing the login request message hIDi;M2;M3i from Ui. Sj per-
forms the following steps:
 Step 1: Sj ﬁrst checks the format of IDi. If it is valid, Sj com-
putes M4 ¼ hðIDijjX sÞ, M5 ¼ M2 M4. Sj then veriﬁes
whether the condition M3 ¼ hðM4jjM5Þ holds or not. If this
condition holds, Sj generates a random number Rs and
computes M6 ¼ M4  Rs, M7 ¼ hðM4jjRsÞ, and sends the
message hM6;M7i to the user Ui.
 Step 2: When the user Ui receives the message hM6;M7i
from Sj, Ui computes M8 ¼ M6 M1, and then checks if
the conditionM7 ¼ hðM1jjM8Þ holds or not. If the condition
holds, Ui further computes M9 ¼ hðM1jjRcjjM8Þ. Ui sends
the message hM9i to Sj for mutual authentication.
 Step 3: Finally, after receiving the message hM9i from Ui, Sj
veriﬁes the condition M9 ¼ hðM4jjM5jjRsÞ. If the condition
is true, Sj will accept the user login request and Ui will be
treated as a legitimate user.
4. Cryptanalysis of An’s scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of An’s scheme in the
following subsections.
4.1. Flaw in user’s biometric veriﬁcation during the login phase
In the registration phase of An’s scheme, the user Ui sends the
message hIDi;PWi  K;Bi  Ki securely to the registration ser-
ver Rj via a secure channel. After receiving the message, Rj
computes fi ¼ hðBi  KÞ and issues a smart card withinformation ðIDi; hðÞ; fi; eiÞ. The user Ui also stores the secret
number K into the memory of the smart card. Note that the
secret value K is ﬁxed and not changed in the smart card.
When the user Ui wants to login to the remote server Sj, Ui
ﬁrst inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and inputs
his/her personal biometric pattern Bi . The smart card then
computes the hash value fi ¼ hðBi  KÞ using the ﬁxed stored
secret number K into the smart card. As stated in An’s scheme,
for biometric veriﬁcation the smart card checks the condition
fi ¼ fi using the stored value of fi. As pointed out in Das
(2011a), the input biometric patterns belonging to the same
person may slightly differ from time to time, for example
ﬁngerprint and voiceprint. Due to the sensitive property of
the one-way hash function hðÞ, even if there is a small
perturbation in the user’s biometric input Bi (described in
Section 2) the veriﬁcation condition fi ¼ fi may never succeed.
Thus, this may cause a serious issue for the legal user to pass
the biometric veriﬁcation during the login phase. As a result,
An’s scheme fails to provide the strong biometric veriﬁcation
procedure.
4.2. Flaw in user’s password veriﬁcation during the login and
authentication phases
In practice, a user Ui keeps different passwords for different
purposes and applications. We assume that the user Ui enters
his/her password wrongly during the login phase. Let this
entered password be PWi , where PW

i–PWi.
During the login phase of An’s scheme, the user Ui ﬁrst
enters his/her biometric information Bi on a speciﬁc device in
order to verify whether his/her biometric veriﬁcation passes
or not. Suppose that the biometric veriﬁcation passes. After
that assume that the user Ui enters his/her password PW

i by
mistake ðPWi–PWiÞ. In An’s scheme, the smart card never
veriﬁes the user’s entered password during this login phase.
Instead, even if the user Ui enters his/her password incorrectly
by mistake, the smart card computes and sends the login
request message to the remote server Sj. During the
authentication phase, the login request is rejected by Sj.
However, there is no way to know for the user Ui whether
he/she entered his/her password incorrectly. This serious prob-
lem results to cause unnecessarily extra communication and
computational overheads performed by the user, the smart
card and the remote server during the login as well as
authentication phases. The detailed mathematical cryptanaly-
sis of this problem is outlined below.
Based on the identity IDi and password PW

i entered by the
user Ui, the smart card will generate a random nonce Rc and
compute the following:
ri ¼hðPWi  KÞ  fi
–hðPWi  KÞ  fi; since PWi–PWi ð1Þ
M1 ¼ei  ri
¼hðIDi  XsÞ  ri  ri
–hðIDi  XsÞ; since PWi–PWi ð2Þ
M2 ¼M1  Rc
–hðIDi  XsÞ  Rc; since PWi–PWi ð3Þ
M3 ¼hðM1jjRcÞ
–hðhðIDi  XsÞjjRcÞ; since PWi–PWi: ð4Þ
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to Sj for authentication of login request by the server Sj.
After receiving the login request message from Ui, Sj checks
the format of IDi. If it is valid, then Sj is allowed to proceed for
computing the following:
M4 ¼hðIDijjXsÞ; ð5Þ
M5 ¼M2 M4
–Rc; using Eqs: ð3Þ and ð5Þ: ð6Þ
Sj will further compute the hash value hðM4jjM5Þ
–hðhðIDijjXsÞjjRcÞ. When Sj will verify the condition
M3 ¼ hðM4jjM5Þ, this condition will certainly fail. Thus, Sj will
reject the login request message and terminate the authentica-
tion process. This leads to the server Sj to think the user Ui as a
cheater, but Ui is actually an honest user. Hence, An’s scheme
fails to provide strong authentication during the login and
authentication phases.
4.3. Flaw in user’s password change
The password change by the user Ui at any time locally and
freely without contacting the registration center Rj is not pro-
vided in An’s scheme. However, this is extremely important
that the user Ui must be allowed to change his/her password
later at any time due to security reasons.
In order to support password change by the user in An’s
scheme, the following steps need to be executed:
 Step 1: The user Ui ﬁrst inserts his/her smart card into a
card reader and then enters his/her personal biometric
information Bi on the speciﬁc device in order to verify user’s
biometric. The smart card then computes the hash value
hðBi  KÞ using the stored secret number K in its memory
and matches it with the stored hash value f i. If they are
equal, the user passes the biometric veriﬁcation.
 Step 2: The user Ui is now allowed to input his/her identity
IDi, and old password PW oldi and new password PW
new
i . The
smart card then computes the following:
x ¼ hðPWoldi  KÞ  fi;
y ¼ ei  x;
r0i ¼ hðPWnewi  KÞ  fi;
e0i ¼ y r0i:
 Step 3: Finally, the smart card updates ei by the new e0i into
its memory.
We now show that An’s scheme has a very serious irrecov-
erable problem during the password change phase. As in
Section 4.2 we also assume that the user Ui enters his/her pass-
word incorrectly by mistake. After biometric veriﬁcation, let
the user Ui input his/her identity IDi and old password
PWoldi incorrectly by mistake followed by the new changed
password PWnewi . Since the old password veriﬁcation does
not occur in this phase, the smart card proceeds with the incor-
rect old password as follows:x0 ¼hðPWoldi  KÞ  fi
¼hðPWoldi  KÞ  hðBi  KÞ ð7Þ
y0 ¼ei  x0; using Eq: ð7Þ
¼hðIDijjXsÞ  hðPWi  KÞ  hðBi  KÞ
 hðPWoldi  KÞ  hðBi  KÞ
–hðIDijjXsÞ; since PWi–PWoldi ð8Þ
r00i ¼hðPWnewi  KÞ  fi; ð9Þ
e00i ¼y0  r00i ; using Eqs: ð8Þ and ð9Þ
–hðIDijjXsÞ  r00i :
As a result, updation of ei by e
00
i will not occur correctly in the
smart card’s memory. As a consequence of this serious prob-
lem, when the same user will login later in the system providing
his/her own biometrics and new changed correct password
PWnewi , the login request message of the user will always be
rejected by the remote server Sj even if the user passes the bio-
metric veriﬁcation successfully in that time. Thus, this problem
will continue in subsequent password change phases by that
user also. In order to withstand such serious problem, the user
will not have any other option except to issue another new
smart card providing the necessary information such as his/
her identity, biometrics and new password securely to the
registration center Rj as done in the registration phase.
Hence, An’s scheme fails completely to provide the correct
password change phase.
4.4. Insider attack
As in An’s scheme, we also assume that an attacker can access
a smart card and extract the secret values stored in the smart
card by power analysis attack (Kocher et al., 1999;
Messerges et al., 2002). Suppose the smart card has been lost
and the attacker is the registration center Rj itself. During
the registration phase, Rj knows the values IDi;PWi  K and
Bi  K, but not K. Note that after issuing the smart card by
Rj, the user stores the secret value K into the smart card. If
the attacker ðRjÞ can extract information from the smart card,
Rj will know K. Now, using K the registration server Rj easily
retrieves not only the user’s password, but also the biometric
information as follows:
PWi ¼ ðPWi  KÞ  K;
Bi ¼ ðBi  KÞ  K:
Hence, it is clear that An’s scheme also fails to protect insider
attack. As a consequence, if the user Ui uses the same pass-
word for some other applications, then the attacker being
the insider of the server can have access to those applications
too. The main problem was that the information PWi  K
and Bi  K were not sent as their hash values hðPWi  KÞ
and hðBi  KÞ to the registration server Rj via a secure channel.
5. The proposed scheme
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the main motivation behind
our proposed scheme. We then discuss the threat model under
which we analyze the proposed scheme. We ﬁnally describe the
various phases of our scheme.
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Though An’s scheme (An, 2012) is efﬁcient, it suffers from
several security weaknesses such as (i) it has ﬂaw in user’s
biometric veriﬁcation during the login phase, (ii) it has ﬂaw
in user’s password veriﬁcation during the login and authentica-
tion phases, and (iii) ﬂaw in user’s password change locally at
any time by the user. In addition, An’s scheme fails to prevent
insider attack. This motivates us that there is a great need to
propose an improvement of An’s scheme for making it useful
for practical applications. Thus, in order to withstand the
security ﬂaws found in An’s scheme, we propose a new efﬁcient
biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using
smart cards. Compared to An’s scheme, our scheme supports
efﬁciently the changing of user’s password locally and correctly
at any time by the user without contacting the remote server,
uniqueness and anonymity preserving properties, and strong
replay attack protection. Through the informal and formal
security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against
all possible known attacks including the attacks found in
An’s scheme. The simulation results of our scheme using the
widely-accepted AVISPA tool ensure that our scheme is secure
against passive and active attacks.
5.2. Threat model
We use the similar threat model as used in Das and Goswami
(2013). We use the Dolev–Yao threat model (Dolev and Yao,
1983) in which any two communicating parties can communi-
cate over a public insecure channel. This means that an
attacker (adversary) can eavesdrop all transmitted messages,
and the attacker will have the ability to modify, delete or
change the contents of the transmitted messages over the
public channel. The smart card of a user is generally equipped
with tamper-resistant device. If the user’s smart card is lost or
stolen, an attacker can still know all the sensitive stored infor-
mation from the memory of the smart card using the power
analysis attack (Kocher et al., 1999; Messerges et al., 2002).
Though some smart card manufacturers consider the risk of
side-channel attacks and provide the countermeasures to deter
the reverse engineering attempts, we still assume that an
attacker will know all the sensitive information from the
memory of the user’s smart card once it is stolen or lost.
5.3. Description of the proposed scheme
In this section, four phases of our scheme, namely registration
phase, login phase, authentication phase, and password change
phase, are described in the following subsections. The conven-
tional hashing is not practical for biometric veriﬁcation,
because biometric data (for example, ﬁngerprint, voice, palm,
etc.) change with time and environment. To address this issue
researchers have suggested to use the perceptual hashing,
where two biometric data of the same person should have
nearly similar hash values (Perceptual Hashing, 2013).
However, due to security reasons, in this paper, we have used
the fuzzy extractor (Burnett et al., 2007; Dodis et al., 2004) in
order to perform biometric veriﬁcation of a user for our
proposed scheme.5.3.1. Registration phase
A user Ui ﬁrst needs to register to a trusted registration center
Rj before he/she is allowed to login to the remote server Sj to
access services from the server Sj. The following steps are
required in order to complete the registration process:
 Step R1: At ﬁrst, the user Ui inputs his/her high-entropy or
strong identity IDi, personal biometrics Bi (for example, ﬁn-
gerprint) on a speciﬁc device of the terminal. Ui then
chooses his/her high-entropy or strong password PW i and
generates a random 1024-bit number K, which is kept secret
to him/her only. Since the chosen identity IDi and PW i are
assumed to be high-entropy, the guessing attack on these
by any attacker will be a computationally infeasible
problem in our scheme.
 Step R2: Ui computes the masked password RPW i ¼
hðIDijjKjjPW iÞ using the one-way hash function hðÞ, IDi,
K and PW i, and the masked biometrics f i ¼ HðIDijjKjjBiÞ
using the BioHashing HðÞ, IDi, K, and Bi. Ui then applies
the GenðÞ algorithm that takes the user Ui’s personal bio-
metric Bi as input and outputs a key data bi and a public
reproduction parameter pari, where GenðBiÞ ¼ ðbi; pariÞ.
Ui also computes ri ¼ hðRPW ijjf ijjbiÞ and then sends the
registration request message hIDi; rii to the registration
center Rj via a secure channel.
 Step R3: After receiving the registration request message in
Step R2, Rj computes
ei ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  ri;
where Xs is a 1024-bit secret number kept secret to the ser-
ver Sj only.Rj then selects a random identity NIDi for the
user Ui and then computes
TDi ¼ NIDi  hðIDiÞ; and
Di ¼ TDi;
as in Das and Goswami (2013) in order to provide the user
anonymity property.
 Step R4: Rj issues a smart card Ci to the user Ui, which con-
tains the information ðTDi;Di; hðÞ;RepðÞ; ri; eiÞ and sends
the smart card Ci to Ui via a secure channel. Note that in
our scheme the smart card Ci does not contain the user
identity IDi directly as compared to An’s scheme (An,
2012). As pointed out in Das and Goswami (2013), the
probability to guess a correct identity composed of exact
m characters is approximately 1
26m
. Further, to guess the
password PW i of exact n characters from ri knowing the
information f i, the attacker has to guess the identity IDi
of exact m characters and the biometric key bi composed
of l bits, and the probability to guess PW i then becomes
approximately 1
26mþ6nþl, which is also negligible.
 Step R5: After receiving the smart card Ci, the user Ui
stores the secret number K, the computed information
f i; pari, and a serial number SNi ¼ 0 into his/her smart card
Ci as in Lee and Liu (2013). Note that SNi is used to protect
the parallel session attacks. Finally, the user Ui’s smart card
Ci contains the information ðTDi;Di; hðÞ;RepðÞ; f i; ri;
ei; pariÞ.
The registration phase of our scheme is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 Registration phase of our scheme.
User Ui Registration center Rj
Chooses IDi, selects PWi
and generates a random
number K. Inputs Bi.
Computes RPWi; fi,
GenðBiÞ ¼ ðbi; pariÞ; ri.
hIDi; rii
!
(via a secure channel)
Selects a random identity
NIDi. Computes ei,
TDi;Di.
Smart cardðTDi;Di; hðÞ,
RepðÞ; ri; eiÞ 
(via a secure channel)
Stores K; fi; pari in Ci.
Stores SNi ¼ 0 in Ci.
Table 3 Login phase of our scheme.
User ðUiÞ/Smart card ðCiÞ Remote server Sj
Inputs IDi and Bi.
Computes b0i ¼ RepðBi; pariÞ.
Inputs PWi, and computes
RPW0i ¼ hðIDijjKjjPWiÞ,
r0i ¼ hðRPW0ijjfijjb0iÞ.
Checks if r0i ¼ ri ? If it holds,
selects a random nonce Rc,
increments SNi ¼ SNi þ 1,
and then computes
NID0i ¼ hðIDiÞ Di,
M1 ¼ ei  r0i,
M2 ¼M1  SNi,
M3 ¼M1  Rc,
M4 ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM1Þ.
hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i
!
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If a user Ui wants to login to the remote server Sj, he/she needs
to perform the following steps:
 Step L1: Ui ﬁrst inserts his/her smart card Ci into a speciﬁc
card reader of the terminal, and inputs his/her identity IDi
and personal biometric Bi on the speciﬁc device. Ci com-
putes b0i ¼ RepðBi; pariÞ using the function RepðÞ;Bi, and
stored pari in its memory.
 Step L2: Ui then enters his/her password PW i. Ci computes
the masked password RPW 0i ¼ hðIDijjKjjPW iÞ using entered
IDi; PW i, and stored K with the help of the one-way hash
function hðÞ. After that Ci computes r0i ¼ hðRPW 0ijjf ijjb0iÞ,
where b0i is already computed in Step L1, and checks if
the condition r0i ¼ ri holds. If it holds, the user Ui passes
the biometric as well as password veriﬁcation simultane-
ously. Otherwise, this phase terminates immediately.
 Step L3: Ci selects a random nonce Rc, increments SNi by 1,
that is, SNi ¼SNi þ 1, and then computes
NID0i ¼hðIDiÞ Di;
M1 ¼ei  r0i
¼hðIDijjXsÞ;
M2 ¼M1  SNi;
¼hðIDijjXsÞ  SNi;
M3 ¼M1  Rc;
¼hðIDijjXsÞ  Rc; and
M4 ¼hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM1Þ;
¼hðIDijjSNijjRcjjhðIDijjXsÞÞ:
Ci ﬁnally sends the login request message
hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i to the server Sj for authentication via
a public channel.
This phase is summarized in Table 3.
5.3.3. Authentication phase
As suggested in Das and Goswami (2013), we have two cases
(Case I and Case II) for our authentication phase in order toprotect denial-of-service (DoS) attack. In Case I, the latest
identities kept by Ci and Sj are matched against each other.
On the other hand, in Case II, the latest random identities kept
by Ci and Sj are different.
After receiving the login request message hNID0i;M2;
M3;M4i from the user Ui, the following steps are executed in
order to perform mutual authentication between Ui and Sj,
and then establish a secret session key between Ui and Sj so
that they can communicate securely after successful
authentication for their future communications:
 Step A1: Sj ﬁrst checks the format of the received NID0i in
the login request message and then ﬁnds the entry
ðIDi;NID0iÞ in the ID table. If it is found in the ID table,
Case I is executed. Otherwise, Sj proceeds for Case II to
authenticate the user Ui.
Case I:
 Step A2: Sj computes
M5 ¼hðIDijjXsÞ; and
M6 ¼M2 M5
¼SNi:
Sj checks the validity of M6 by checking the condition
M6 > SN, where SN is initialized to 0 and it is kept to
the server Sj. Note that M6 ¼ SNi. If this condition does
not hold, Sj rejects the login request message of Ui and
the phase terminates immediately. Otherwise, Sj computes
M7 ¼M3 M5
¼Rc; and
M8 ¼hðIDijjM6jjM7jjM5Þ:
Sj then checks the condition M8 ¼M4. If it does not hold,
Sj rejects the login request of Ui and the phase terminates
immediately.As in Das (2011a), we adopt the following
similar strategy for resisting the replay and man-in-the-mid-
dle attacks. Sj can store the pair ðIDi;M7Þ in its database.
Note that M7 ¼ Rc. Later when Sj receives another login
Table 4 Authentication phase of our scheme.
User ðUiÞ/Smart card ðCiÞ Remote server Sj
hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i
!
Veriﬁes format of NID0i. If it holds,
computes M5 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ,
M6 ¼M2 M5, and
checks if M6 > SN?
If it holds, Sj computes
M7 ¼M3 M5,
M8 ¼ hðIDijjM6jjM7jjM5Þ,
and checks if M8 ¼M4?.
If it holds, Sj generates Rs and
computes M9 ¼M5  Rs,
M10 ¼ hðRsjjM7jjM6Þ NIDnewi ,
M11 ¼ hðIDijjM6jjM7 þ 1jjRsjjM5
jjNIDnewi Þ.
hM9;M10;M11i 
Computes M12 ¼M9 M1,
M13 ¼ hðM12jjRcjjSNiÞ,
M14 ¼M13 M10,
M15 ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRc þ 1jj
M12jjM1jjM14Þ, and checks if
M11 ¼M15? If it holds,
Ci updates TDi and Di, and
computes
M16 ¼ hðIDijjSNijj
Rc þ 1jjM12 þ 1jjM1jjM14Þ
hM16i
!
Computes
M17 ¼ hðIDijjM6jjM7 þ 1jj
Rs þ 1jjM5jjNIDnewi Þ and veriﬁes if
M16 ¼M17? If it holds, accepts
Ui as legitimate user.
Computes
SKUi ;Sj ¼hðIDijjSNi
Computes
SKUi ;Sj ¼hðIDijjM6jjM7jj
jjRcjjM12jjM1jjM3Þ. RsjjM5jjM3Þ.
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the server Sj ﬁnds the entry ðIDi;NID0iÞ in its ID table,
computes M05 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ and M06 ¼ M02 M05, and then
checks if M06 > SN. If it does not hold, the phase
terminates immediately. Otherwise, Sj further computes
M07 ¼M03 M05, and M08 ¼hðIDijjM06jjM07jjM05Þ, and checks
the condition M08 ¼M04. If it holds, this ensures that the
login request message hNID0i;M02;M03;M04i is certainly a
replay message and Sj simply discards this message.
Otherwise, it is considered as a fresh message and in this
case, Sj updates ðIDi;M7Þ with ðIDi;M07Þ in its database.
 Step A3: Sj generates a random nonce Rs, and then
computes
M9 ¼M5  Rs
¼hðIDijjXsÞ  Rs;
M10 ¼hðRsjjM7jjM6Þ NIDnewi
¼hðRsjjRcjjSNiÞ NIDnewi ;
where NIDnewi is a random and temporary identity gener-
ated by Sj. Sj then computes
M11 ¼hðIDijjM6jjM7 þ 1jjRsjjM5jjNIDnewi Þ
¼hðIDijjSNijjRc þ 1jjRsjjhðIDijjXsÞ
jjNIDnewi Þ;
and sends the authentication request message hM9;M10;M11i
to the user Ui via a public channel.
 Step A4: After receiving the authentication request message
in Step A3 from the server Sj;Ci computes
M12 ¼M9 M1
¼hðIDijjXsÞ  Rs  hðIDijjXsÞ
¼Rs;
M13 ¼hðM12jjRcjjSNiÞ
¼hðRsjjRcjjSNiÞ;
M14 ¼M13 M10
¼NIDnewi :
Ci further computesM15 ¼hðIDijjSNijjRc þ 1jjM12jjM1jjM14Þ
and then checks if the condition M11 ¼M15 holds. If it
does not hold, this phase terminates immediately.
Otherwise, Ci updates TDi and Di in its memory with the
values Di and Di NID0i M14, respectively.
 Step A5: Ci computes M16 ¼hðIDijjSNijjRc þ 1jjM12 þ 1
jjM1jjM14Þ and sends the authentication acknowledgment
message hM16i to the server Sj for mutual authentication.
Ci also computes a secret session key shared between the
user Ui and the server Sj as SKUi ;Sj ¼hðIDijjSNijjRcjj
M12jjM1 jjM3Þ.
 Step A6: Finally, after receiving the authentication
acknowledgment message hM16i from the user Ui, the server
Sj computes M17 ¼hðIDijjM6jjM7 þ1jjRs þ 1jjM5jjNIDnewi Þ
and veriﬁes whether the condition M16 ¼ M17 holds. If it
does not hold, this phase terminates immediately.
Otherwise, Sj considers Ui as a legitimate user and
computes the same secret session key shared with the user
Ui as SKUi ;Sj ¼hðIDijjM6jjM7jjRsjjM5jjM3Þ.Case II:
 Step A7: Processes in this case are almost same as those in
Case I except the following. NID0i is obtained by computing
hðIDiÞ  TDi instead of hðIDiÞ  Di in Step L3 of the login
phase. Further, Ci needs to only update Di with
Di  NID0i M14 without changing TDi in Step A4.
The authentication phase of our scheme is summarized in
Table 4.
5.3.4. Password change phase
It is desirable for security reasons that a user Ui should change
his/her password periodically. This phase describes the proce-
dure for changing the old password of the user Ui by his/her
new chosen password in the smart card locally and efﬁciently
without contacting the remote registration server Rj. The fol-
lowing steps are involved in this phase:
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sonal biometrics Bi on a speciﬁc smart card device of the
terminal. Ci then computes b

i ¼RepðBi; pariÞ using the func-
tion RepðÞ, entered biometrics Bi, and stored pari in its
memory.
 Step P2: Ui then enters his/her old password PW oldi and cho-
sen new password PW newi . Ci computes the old masked pass-
word RPW i ¼hðIDijjK jjPW oldi Þ using the entered IDi; PW oldi ,
and stored K with the help of the one-way hash function
hðÞ, and ri ¼hðRPW i jjf ijjbi Þ and then checks if ri ¼ ri
holds. If it does not hold, Ui enters his/her biometrics Bi
and password PW oldi incorrectly and the phase terminates
immediately. Otherwise, Step P3 is executed.
 Step P3: Ci further computes
ei ¼ei  ri
¼hðIDijjXsÞ  ri  ri
¼hðIDijjXsÞ; since ri ¼ ri;
RPWi ¼hðIDijjKjjPWnewi Þ;
ri ¼hðRPWi jjfijjbi Þ
¼hðhðIDijjKjjPWnewi ÞjjfijjbiÞ;
ei ¼ei  ri :
 Step P4: Finally, Ci updates ri with ri and ei with ei in
its memory.
Note that in our password change phase, the new password of
a user is always changed correctly and locally without further
contacting the remote server.
6. Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we ﬁrst show the correctness of our scheme for
establishing the common secret session key between the user
and the server. We then show that our scheme is secure against
various known attacks.
6.1. Correctness
In the following theorem, we give the correctness of our
scheme.
Theorem 1. Our scheme always establishes the correct secret
session key between the user Ui and the server Sj during the
authentication phase after a successful mutual authentication
between them.
Proof. During the authentication phase of our scheme, in
Steps A4 and A5, after the successful veriﬁcation of the condi-
tionM11 ¼M15 the smart card Ci of the user Ui computesM16
and sends the authentication acknowledgment message hM16i
to the server Sj. Ci computes the secret session key shared
between Ui and Sj as SKUi ;Sj ¼hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM12jjM1jjM3Þ.
Note that M1 ¼ ei  ri ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ;M3 ¼M1  Rc ¼
hðIDijjXsÞ  Rc, and M12 ¼M9 M1 ¼ Rs. Thus, SKUi ;Sj ¼
hðIDijjSNijjRcjjRsjjhðIDijjXsÞjjhðIDijjXsÞ  RcÞ.In Step A6, after receiving the authentication acknowl-
edgment message hM16i, the server Sj veriﬁes the condition
M16 ¼M17. If it holds, Sj accepts Ui as a legitimate user
and computes the secret session key shared with Ui as
SKSj;Ui ¼hðIDijjM6jjM7jjRsjjM5jjM3Þ. Note that M6 ¼
M2 M5 ¼ SNi;M7 ¼M3 M5 ¼ Rc;M5 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ;
M3 ¼M1  Rc ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  Rc, and thus, SKSj;Ui ¼
hðIDijjSNijjRcjjRsjjhðIDijjXsÞjjhðIDijjXsÞ  RcÞ. As a result,
SKUi;Sj ¼ SKSj;Ui and hence the theorem. h6.2. Informal security analysis
In this section, we show that our scheme has the ability to tol-
erate various known attacks, which are given in the following
theorems.
Theorem 2. Our scheme is secure against stolen smart card
attacks.
Proof. The smart card is usually equipped with tamper-resis-
tant device. Assume that the smart card Ci of a user Ui is lost
or stolen. Having the smart card, the attacker can still retrieve
all the sensitive information stored in the stolen smart card’s
memory using the power analysis attack (Kocher et al., 1999;
Messerges et al., 2002) as described in our threat model in
Section 5.2. Thus, we assume that the attacker knows the infor-
mation ðTDi;Di; hðÞ;RepðÞ; fi; ri; ei; pariÞ, and K and SNi.
Note that TDi ¼ NIDi  hðIDiÞ;Di ¼ TDi; fi ¼ HðIDijjKjjBiÞ;
GenðBiÞ ¼ ðbi; pariÞ; ri ¼ hðhðIDijjKjjPWiÞjjfijjbiÞ; ei ¼ hðIDi
jjXsÞ  ri. It is also noted that the user Ui’s identity IDi is not
stored in the smart card. Using ei and ri, the attacker can obtain
hðIDijjXsÞ ¼ ei  ri. As pointed out in Das and Goswami, 2013,
the probability to guess a correct identity composed of exact n
characters is approximately 1
26n
. If Xs is m bits (in our scheme,
m ¼ 1024), the probability to guess both IDi and Xs at the same
time is approximately 1
26nþm ¼ 126nþ1024, which is very negligible.
Further, to guess the password PWi of exact n characters from
ri, the attacker has to guess the identity IDi of exact m characters
and the biometric key bi composed of l bits, and the probability
to guess PWi then becomes approximately
1
26mþ6nþl, which is also
negligible. In addition, the attacker has no way to obtain Bi from
fi due to secure BioHashing functionHðÞ, since IDi is unknown
to that attacker. Hence, our scheme is secure against smart card
stolen attacks. h
Theorem 3. Our scheme is secure against replay attacks.
Proof. Assume that the attacker intercepts the transmitted
messages hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i during the login phase, and
hM9;M10;M11i and hM16i during the authentication phase in
a previous session. Suppose the attacker wants to start a new
session with the login request message hNID0i;M02;M03;M04i
¼ hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i. Note that M4 ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM1Þ.
In Step A2 of our authentication phase, the server Sj stores
the pair ðIDi;M7Þ in its database, where M7 ¼ Rc. When Sj
receives this login request message hNID0i;M02;M03;M04i, the
server Sj ﬁrst ﬁnds the entry ðIDi;NID0iÞ in its ID table, and
then computes M05 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ and M06 ¼ M02 M05. After
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0
6 > SN holds or not. If it
holds, Sj further computes M
0
7 ¼M03 M05 ¼ Rc, and M08 ¼
hðIDijjM06jjM07jjM05Þ, and checks the condition M08 ¼M04. If it
holds, this ensures that the login request message
hNID0i;M02;M03;M04i is certainly a replay message and Sj simply
discards this message. Thus, our scheme has the ability to
protect the replay attacks. h
Theorem 4. Our scheme protects impersonation attacks.
Proof. In the following, we show that an attacker does not
have any ability to impersonate the remote server Sj or a legal
user Ui. Assume that the attacker intercepts the transmitted
messages hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i during the login phase, and
hM9;M10;M11i and hM16i during the authentication phase.
Suppose the attacker wants to start a new session. To start
the session, the attacker needs to modify the login request mes-
sage hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i in order to impersonate the server Sj,
where M2 ¼M1  SNi ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  SNi;M3 ¼M1  Rc
¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  Rc, and M4 ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM1Þ. Let the
attacker guess the high-entropy identity ID0i and serial number
SN0i. Then the attacker can compute hðIDijjXsÞ0 ¼M2  SN0i
and R0c ¼M3  hðIDijjXsÞ0. After that the attacker needs to
compute M04 ¼ hðID0ijjSN0ijjR0cjjhðIDijjXsÞ0Þ and checks if
M4 ¼M04 holds, if it holds, the attacker can change M2;M3
and M4. However, the probability of guessing the identity
IDi composed of exact n characters and the serial number
SNi composed of exact m bits is approximately
1
26nþm, which is
negligible. Note that the attacker does not know IDi;SNi
and Rc. Suppose the attacker changes M2 and M3 to
M002 ¼M2  FSNi and M003 ¼M3  Rac, where FSNi and Rac
are the fake serial number and random nonce of the user Ui
generated by the attacker, respectively. Then the attacker does
not have any ability to compute M004 ¼ hðIDijjðSNi  FSNiÞjj
ðRc  RacÞjjM1Þ and as a result, the attacker cannot modify
M4. The attacker does not have any ability to modify other
messages hM9;M10;M11i and hM16i during the authentication
phase in order to cheat the user Ui also. Hence, our scheme
protects impersonation attacks. h
Theorem 5. Our scheme protects man-in-the-middle attacks.
Proof. Suppose an attacker intercepts the login request mes-
sage hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i during the login phase and tries to
modify the message to hNID0i;M02;M03;M04i. Note that
M2 ¼M1  SNi ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  SNi;M3 ¼M1  Rc ¼ hðIDi
jjXsÞ  Rc, and M4 ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM1Þ ¼ hðIDijjSNijj
RcjjhðIDijjXsÞÞ. If the attacker can guess V ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ cor-
rectly, he/she can recompute M02 ¼ V SN0i;M3 ¼ V Rac
and M4 ¼ hðIDijjSN0ijjRacjjVÞ and sends the message
hNID0i;M02;M03;M04i to the server Sj such that the authentica-
tion passes at the server side. Observe that both IDi and Xs
are unknown to the attacker. Thus, the probability to guess
both IDi composed of exact n characters and Xs of length
exact m bits (in our scheme, m ¼ 1024) at the same time
is approximately 1
26nþm ¼ 126nþ1024, which is very negligible. As
a result, the attacker does not have any ability to modify
properly all the transmitted messages during the login and
authentication phases, and hence, our scheme is secure
against man-in-the-middle attacks. hTheorem 6. Our scheme is secure against ofﬂine guessing
attacks.
Proof. Suppose an attacker tries to retrieve secret data by
intercepting all transmitted messages hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i
during the login phase, and hM9;M10;M11i and hM16i during
the authentication phase in a previous session. If the attacker
can guess V ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ correctly, he/she can compute
SN0i ¼M2  V and R0c ¼M3  V. However, the probability
to guess both IDi composed of exact n characters and Xs of
length exact m bits (in our scheme, m ¼ 1024) at the same time
is approximately 1
26nþm ¼ 126nþ1024, which is very negligible. On the
other hand, if we assume that the smart card of a user is lost or
stolen, then from Theorem 2 it is also clear that this is a com-
putationally infeasible problem for the attacker to derive the
password PWi and personal biometrics Bi of the user Ui.
Thus, our scheme is also secure against ofﬂine guessing
attacks. h
Theorem 7. Our scheme is secure against denial-of-service
attacks.
Proof. Note that in our scheme, the smart card Ci of a user Ui
stores TDi and Di for the previous as well as latest random
identities so that the corruption of the message hM16i is not
possible. As a result, our scheme is secure against denial-of-
service attacks. h
Theorem 8. Our scheme prevents parallel session attacks.
Proof. Suppose an attacker intercepts the login request mes-
sage hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i during the login phase and wants to
start a parallel session. Note that the server Sj computes
M5 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ and M6 ¼M2 M5 ¼ SNi. Sj then veriﬁes
the condition whetherM6 > SN, where SN is kept to the server
Sj. Thus, the attacker does not have ability to start a parallel
session due to usage of SNi by the user Ui. Hence, our scheme
has the ability to prevent parallel session attacks. h6.3. Formal security analysis
In this section, through the formal security analysis we show
that our scheme is provably secure against an adversary for
deriving the secret session key shared between a user and the
server. For the formal security analysis, we follow the random
oracle model as used in Chatterjee et al. (2014), Das et al.
(2013) and Islam and Biswas (2013, 2014).
For the formal security analysis, we ﬁrst deﬁne the formal
deﬁnition of a one-way hash function hðÞ as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (One-way hash function). As in Sarkar (2010) and
Stinson (2006), we deﬁne a one-way collision-resistant hash
function h : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gn as a deterministic algorithm that
takes as input an arbitrary length binary string x 2 f0; 1g and
outputs a binary string y ¼ hðxÞ 2 f0; 1gn of ﬁxed-length n. We
formalize an adversary A’s advantage in ﬁnding collision in the
following manner.
AdvHASHA ðtÞ ¼ Pr½ðx; x0Þ ( A : x–x0 and hðxÞ ¼ hðx0Þ;
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ðx; x0Þ ( A denotes the pair ðx; x0Þ is selected randomly by
A. In this case, the adversary A is allowed to be probabilistic
and the probability in the advantage is computed over the ran-
dom choices made by the adversary A with the execution time
t. The hash function hðÞ is said to be collision-resistant if
AdvHASHA ðtÞ 6 , for any sufﬁciently small  > 0.
We then deﬁne the following random oracle for our analysis:
 Reveal: This random oracle will unconditionally output the
input x from the corresponding hash value y ¼ hðxÞ.Theorem 9. Under the assumption that the one-way collision-
resistant hash function hðÞ closely behaves like a random oracle,
our scheme is provably secure against an adversary for deriving
the secret session key SKUi;Sj shared between the user Ui and the
server Sj.
Algorithm 1. EXPHASHA;BRUAS1: Eavesdrop the login request message hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i
during the login phase, where
M1 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ;M2 ¼M1  SNi ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  SNi;
M3 ¼M1  Rc ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ  Rc, and
M4 ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRcjjM1Þ ¼ hðIDijjSNijjRcjjhðIDijjXsÞÞ.2: Call Reveal oracle on input M4 to retrieve the information
IDi;SNi;Rc, and M1.Let ðID0ijjSN0ijjR0cjjM01Þ  RevealðM4Þ.
3: Compute SN00i ¼M2 M01 and R00c ¼M3 M01. If SN00i
matches with SN0i and R
00
c matches with R
0
c, accept SN
0
i and R
0
c
as the correct SNi and Rc, respectively.4: Eavesdrop the authentication request message hM9;M10;M11i
during the authentication phase, where M9 ¼M5  Rs
¼ hðIDijjXsÞ Rs;M10 ¼ hðRsjjM7jjM6Þ NIDnewi
¼ hðRsjjRcjjSNiÞ NIDnewi ;M11 ¼ hðIDijjM6jj
M7 þ 1jjRsjjM5jjNIDnewi Þ
¼ hðIDijjSNijjRc þ 1jjRsjjhðIDijjXsÞjjNIDnewi Þ.5: Call reveal oracle on input M11 in order to retrieve
information
IDi;M6 ¼ SNi;M7 þ 1 ¼ Rc þ 1;Rs;M5 ¼ hðIDijjXsÞ and
NIDnewi as
ðID00i jjM06jjM07 þ 1jjR0sjjM05jjNIDnew0i Þ  RevealðM11Þ.
6: if ððM06 ¼ SN0iÞ and ðM07 þ 1 ¼ R0c þ 1ÞÞ then
7: Compute the secret session key
SKUi ;Sj ¼ hðID0ijjSN0ijjR0cjjR0sjjM01jjM3Þ.
8: Accept the derived key SKUi ;Sj as the correct secret
session key between the user Ui and the server Sj.9: return 1 (Success)10: else11: return 0 (Failure)12: end ifProof. In this proof, we need to construct an adversary A who
can derive the secret session key SKUi ;Sj shared between the
user Ui and the server Sj. For this purpose, the adversary A
runs the experimental algorithm EXPHASHA;BRUAS given in
Algorithm 1 for our biometric-based remote user authentica-
tion scheme, say BRUAS.We deﬁne the success probability for EXPHASHA;BRUAS provided
in Algorithm 1 as SuccHASHA;BRUAS ¼ Pr½ExpHASHA;BRUAS ¼ 1  1. The
advantage function for this experiment, ExpHASHA;BRUAS becomes
AdvHASHA;BRUASðt1; qR1Þ ¼ maxAfSuccHASHA;BRUASg, where the maxi-
mum is taken over all A with the execution time t1 and the
number of queries qR1 made to the Reveal oracle. Our scheme
is then provably secure against an adversary A for deriving the
secret session key SKUi;Sj shared between the user Ui and the
server Sj, if Adv
HASH
A;BRUASðt1; qR1Þ 6 , for any sufﬁciently small
 > 0.
Consider the experiment EXPHASHA;BRUAS provided in
Algorithm 1. According to this experiment, if the adversary
A has the ability to solve (inverting) the one-way collision-
resistant hash function hðÞ, he/she can derive correctly the
secret session key SKUi;Sj shared between the user Ui and the
server Sj and win the game. However, by Deﬁnition 1,
AdvHASHA ðtÞ 6 , for any sufﬁciently small  > 0. Thus, we
have, AdvHASHA;BRUASðt1; qR1Þ 6 , since it is dependent on
AdvHASHA ðtÞ. As a result, our scheme is provably secure against
an adversary for deriving the secret session key SKUi;Sj shared
between the user Ui and the server Sj. h7. Simulation results for formal security veriﬁcation of our
scheme using AVISPA tool
In this section, we simulate our scheme for the formal security
veriﬁcation using the widely-accepted AVISPA tool (AVISPA,
2013a).
7.1. Overview of AVISPA
AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications) is a push-button tool for the auto-
mated validation of Internet security-sensitive protocols and
applications. It integrates four back-ends which implement a
variety of state-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques.
The ﬁrst back-end, called the On-the-ﬂy Model-Checker
(OFMC), performs several symbolic techniques to explore
the state space in a demand-driven way. The second back-
end, called the Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher
(CL-AtSe), provides a translation from any security protocol
speciﬁcation written as transition relation in an intermediate
format into a set of constraints which are effectively used to
ﬁnd whether there are attacks on protocols. The third back-
end, called the SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC), builds
a propositional formula and then the formula is fed to a
state-of-the-art SAT solver to verify whether there is an attack
or not. Finally, the fourth back-end, called the Tree Automata
based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of
Security Protocols (TA4SP), approximates the intruder
knowledge by using regular tree languages. More details on
AVISPA could be found in AVISPA (2013a).
To analyze the protocols under the AVISPA tool, they are
speciﬁed in a language, called the HLPSL (High Level
Protocols Speciﬁcation Language), which is based on roles:
basic roles for representing each participant role, and com-
position of roles for representing scenarios of basic roles,
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some initial information by parameters, communicating with
the other roles by channels.
A HLPSL speciﬁcation written from a protocol is ﬁrst
translated into a lower level speciﬁcation by a translator, called
the hlpsl2if, which in turn generates a speciﬁcation in an
intermediate format, called the Intermediate Format (IF).
The output format (OF) of AVISPA is generated using one
of the four back-ends speciﬁed above. The analysis of the
OF is made as follows.
 The ﬁrst printed section, called SUMMARY, indicates
whether the protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis
is inconclusive.
 The second section, called DETAILS, explains under what
condition the protocol is declared safe, or what conditions
have been used for ﬁnding an attack, or ﬁnally why the
analysis was inconclusive.
 The remaining sections, called PROTOCOL, GOAL and
BACKEND, are the name of the protocol, the goal of the
analysis and the name of the back-end used, respectively.
 After some possible comments and the statistics, the
trace of the attack (if any) is ﬁnally printed in a standard
Alice-Bob format.
The basic types available in HLPSL are (AVISPA, 2013a):
 agent: Values of type agent represent principal names. The
intruder is always assumed to have the special identiﬁer i.
 public_key: These values represent agents’ public keys in a
public-key cryptosystem. For example, given a public
(respectively private) key pk, its inverse private (respectively
public) key is obtained by inv pk.
 symmetric_key: Variables of this type represent keys for a
symmetric-key cryptosystem.
 text: In HLPSL, text values are often used as nonces. These
values can be used for messages. If Na is of type text
(fresh), then Na0 will be a fresh value which the intruder
cannot guess.
 nat: The nat type represents the natural numbers in non-
message contexts.
 const: This type represents constants.
 hash_func: The base type hash_func represents crypto-
graphic hash functions. The base type function also repre-
sents functions on the space of messages. It is assumed
that the intruder cannot invert hash functions (in essence,
that they are one-way).
The space of legal messages is deﬁned as the closure of
the basic types. For a given message Msg and encryption
key Key, fMsgg Key refers to as the symmetric/ public-key
encryption and the associative ‘‘’’ operator is used for
concatenations.igure 1 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the user Ui of our
cheme.7.2. Specifying our scheme
We have implemented the registration phase, the login phase
and the authentication phase of our scheme using the
HLPSL language. In our implementation, we have two basic
roles, namely alice and bob, which represent the participants
as the user Ui and the remote server Sj, respectively. Thespeciﬁcation in HLPSL language for the role of the initiator,
the user Ui is shown in Fig. 1. The user Ui ﬁrst receives the
start signal and changes its state from 0 to 1, and sends the
registration request message hIDi; fi;RPWii securely to theF
s
Figure 2 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the server Sj of our
scheme.
206 A.K. Das, A. Goswamiserver Sj using the Sndð Þ operation. The user Ui then gets a
smart card issued by the server Sj with the information
ðTDi;Di; hðÞ;RepðÞ; ri; eiÞ securely from Sj by the Rcvð Þ
operation. During the login phase, Ui sends the login request
message hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i to Sj. After receiving the
authentication request message hM9;M10;M11i from Sj;Ui
ﬁnally sends the authentication acknowledgment message
hM16i to Sj.
The type declaration channel ðdyÞ declares that the channel
is for the Dolev–Yao threat model (as described in our threat
model in Section 5.2). In such case, the intruder, which is
always denoted by i, has the ability to intercept, analyze,
and/or modify messages transmitted over the insecure channel.
In HLPSL speciﬁcation, witness(A,B,id,E) declares for a
(weak) authentication property of A by B on E, declares that
agent A is witness for the information E; this goal will be iden-
tiﬁed by the constant id in the goal section (AVISPA, 2013a).
On the other hand, request(B,A,id,E) is for a strong
authentication property of A by B on E, declares that agent
B requests a check of the value E; this goal will be identiﬁed
by the constant id in the goal section (AVISPA, 2013a).
In Fig. 2, we have implemented the speciﬁcation in HLPSL
language for the role of the responder, the remote server Sj.
During the registration phase, after receiving the registration
request message hIDi; rii securely from Ui, Sj issues a smart
card and sends it with the information ðTDi;Di; hðÞ;
RepðÞ; ri; eiÞ securely to Ui. In the authentication phase, after
receiving the login request message hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i;Sj
sends the authentication request message hM9;M10;M11i to
Ui. Finally, Sj waits for the authentication acknowledgment
message hM16i from Ui to ﬁnish the successful mutual
authentication with Ui.
We have speciﬁed the roles for the session, and the goal and
environment of our scheme are speciﬁed in Figs. 3 and 4. In the
session segment, all the basic roles: alice and bob are instanced
with concrete arguments. The top-level role (environment) is
always deﬁned in the speciﬁcation of HLPSL language. This
role contains the global constants and a composition of one
or more sessions, where the intruder may play some roles as
legitimate users. The intruder also participates in the execution
of protocol as a concrete session. The declaration witness(A, B,
bob_alice_rs, Rs0) tells that A has freshly generated the value rs
for B. The declaration request(A, B, alice_bob_rc, Rc0) means
that B’s acceptance of the value rc generated for B by A. In
other words, the agent B authenticates the agent A. The
declaration secret(X, t, A) indicates that X is kept secret
permanently to B. The label t (of type protocol_id) is used to
identify the goal.
In our implementation, the following three secrecy goals
and two authentications are veriﬁed:
 secrecy_of subs1: It represents that X s is kept secret to the
server Sj only.
 secrecy_of subs2: It indicates that PW i, Bi, bi, K, and SNi are
kept secret to the user Ui only.
 secrecy_of subs3: It tells that IDi is kept secret to both Ui
and Sj.
 authentication_on alice_bob_rc: Ui ðCiÞ generates a ran-
dom nonce Rc, where Rc is only known to Ui. When the
Figure 3 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the session of our
scheme.
Figure 4 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the goal and
environment of our scheme.
Figure 5 The result of the analysis using OFMC of our scheme.
Biometric-based remote user authentication scheme 207server Sj receives Rc from the messages from Ui; Sj performs
strong authentication for Ui.
 authentication_on bob_alice_rs: Sj generates a random
nonce Rs, where Rs is only known to Sj. If the user Ui
receives Rs from the messages from Sj;Ui performs strong
authentication for Sj.
In the goal section of the protocol, we write
authentication on alice bob rc
authentication on bob alice rs
to indicate that the witness and request goal facts containing
those two protocol ids, alice_bob_rc and bob_alice_rs, should
be taken into account.
7.3. Analysis of results
The On-the-Fly Model-Checker (OFMC) builds the inﬁnite
tree deﬁned by the protocol analysis problem in a demand-dri-
ven way, i.e. on-the-ﬂy, hence the name of the back-end. This
backend uses a number of symbolic techniques in order torepresent the state-space. OFMC can be employed not only
for efﬁcient falsiﬁcation of protocols (i.e., fast detection of
attacks), but also for veriﬁcation (i.e., proving the protocol
correct) for a bounded number of sessions - without bounding
the messages an intruder can generate (AVISPA, 2013a).
We have chosen the back-end OFMC for an execution test
and a bounded number of sessions model checking (Basin
et al., 2005). For the replay attack checking, the back-end
checks whether the legitimate agents can execute the speciﬁed
protocol by performing a search of a passive intruder. After
that the back-end gives the intruder the knowledge of some
normal sessions between the legitimate agents. For the
Dolev–Yao model check, the back-end checks whether there
is any man-in-the-middle attack possible by the intruder.
Finally, in this section we have simulated our scheme for
formal security veriﬁcation using the AVISPA web tool
(AVISPA, 2013b) for the most widely-accepted OFMC model
checker. The simulation results for the formal security veriﬁca-
tion analysis of our scheme using OFMC are shown in Fig. 5.
The ﬁrst printed section, SUMMARY indicates whether the
protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis is inconclusive.
It is clear that our scheme is safe from the printed
SUMMARY section. The section, DETAILS explains under
what condition the protocol is declared safe, or what condi-
tions have been used for ﬁnding an attack, or ﬁnally why the
analysis was inconclusive. From Fig. 5, it is noted that our
scheme is declared as safe, and no attack is found in our
scheme. Thus, the results in this ﬁgure ensure that our scheme
is secure against passive and active attacks including the replay
and man-in-the-middle attacks.
8. Performance comparison with related schemes
In this section, we compare the performance of our scheme
with Li–Hwang’s scheme (Li and Hwang, 2010), Li et al.’s
scheme (Li et al., 2011), Das’s scheme (Das, 2011a) and An’s
scheme (An, 2012).
In Table 5, we have compared the communication overhead
of our scheme with that for Li–Hwang’s scheme, Li et al.’s
scheme, Das’s scheme, and An’s scheme, during the login
and authentication phases. In all schemes, we assume that
both identity IDi of the user Ui and the hash digest are 160
bits. During the login and authentication phases, the
Table 5 Comparison of communication overhead between
our scheme and other schemes during the login and authentica-
tion phases.
Scheme Total number of
messages required
Total number of
bits required
Li–Hwang (Li and
Hwang, 2010)
3 800
Li et al. (Li et al.,
2011)
2 960
Das (Das, 2011a) 3 1120
An (An, 2012) 3 960
Ours 3 1280
Table 7 Functionality comparison between our scheme and
other schemes during all phases.
Functionality Li–Hwang
(Li and
Hwang,
2010)
Li et al.
(Li et al.,
2011)
Das
(Das,
2011a)
An
(An,
2012)
Ours
F1 Yes Yes No Yes No
F2 Yes Yes No Yes No
F3 No No No No Yes
F4 No Yes Yes No Yes
F5 No No Yes No Yes
F6 No Yes No Yes Yes
F7 Yes Yes No No Yes
F8 Yes Yes No No Yes
F9 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F10 No Yes Yes No Yes
F11 No Yes No No Yes
F12 No No No No Yes
F13 No No No No Yes
F14 No No No No Yes
F15 No No No No Yes
Notes: F1: whether ﬂaws exist in login and authentication phase; F2:
whether ﬂaws exist in password change phase; F3: whether protects
privileged insider attacks or not; F4: whether protects man-in-the-
middle attacks or not; F5: whether provides proper authentication
or not; F6: whether protects stolen smart card attacks or not; F7:
whether protects impersonation attacks or not; F8: whether resilient
against ofﬂine attacks or not; F9: whether protects DoS attacks or
not; F10: whether resists replay attacks or not; F11: whether estab-
lishes a secret session key between Ui and Sj after successful
authentication or not; F12: whether provides formal security ver-
iﬁcation or not; F13: whether supports user anonymity property or
not; F14: whether supports user auditing property or not; F15:
whether provides uniqueness property or not.
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scheme and Das’s scheme are 800 bits, 960 bits, and 1120 bits,
respectively. In An’s scheme, during the login phase, the mes-
sage hIDi;M2;M3i requires ð160þ 160þ 160Þ ¼ 480 bits, and
during the authentication phase, the messages hM6;M7i and
hM9i require 320 and 160 bits, respectively. Thus, An’s scheme
requires ð480þ 320þ 160Þ ¼ 960 bits. On the other hand, in
our scheme, during the login phase, the message
hNID0i;M2;M3;M4i requires ð160þ 160þ 160þ 160Þ ¼
640 bits, and during the authentication phase, the messages
hM9;M10;M11i and hM16i require 480 and 160 bits, respec-
tively. As a result, our scheme requires ð640þ 480þ
160Þ ¼ 1280 bits for communication overhead.
In Table 6, we have compared the computational overhead
of our scheme with Li–Hwang’s scheme, Li et al.’s scheme,
Das’s scheme, and An’s scheme during all phases. It is clear
to note that due to computational efﬁciency of hash function
hðÞ and BioHashing HðÞ, our scheme is comparable to An’s
scheme. Note that the registration phase is executed only once
and the password change phase is only performed periodically
(not frequently) for security reasons. In our scheme, the func-
tions GenðÞ and RepðÞ used for biometric key generation and
veriﬁcation are efﬁcient. The computational overhead for our
scheme is comparable to that for Li et al.’s scheme (Li et al.,
2011). Though our scheme requires little more communication
and computational overheads as compared to that for Li–
Hwang’s scheme, Das’s scheme, An’s scheme, but considering
the functionality and security services provided by our scheme,Table 6 Comparison of computational overhead between our sche
Phase Entity Li–Hwang (Li and Hwang,
2010)
Li et
2011
Registration Ui=Ci – th
Sj 3th 3th
Login and
authentication
Ui=Ci 3th tbiover
Sj 4th 6th
Password change Ui=Ci 3th tbiover
Sj – –
Notes: tH: time for BioHashing operation; th: time for one-way hashing o
matching in Das (2011a) and Li et al. (2011); tgen: time taken for exec
deterministic RepðÞ algorithm; N/A: not applicable for the scheme.we conclude that our scheme is better than those for other
schemes.
Finally, in Table 7 we have compared the functionality of
our scheme with Li–Hwang’s scheme, Li et al.’s scheme,
Das’s scheme, and An’s scheme. It is clear to see that our
scheme supports efﬁciently and correctly password changeme and other schemes during all phases.
al. (Li et al.,
)
Das (Das,
2011a)
An (An,
2012)
Ours
– – 2th þ tH þ tgen
3th 3th 2th
þ 7th tbiover þ 5th 5th trep þ 7th
5th 4th 6th
þ 4th tbiover þ 2th N/A trep þ 4th
– N/A –
peration; tbiover: time for biometric veriﬁcation using template pattern
uting probabilistic GenðÞ algorithm; trep: time taken for executing
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more, whereas Li–Hwang’s scheme, Li et al.’s scheme and An’s
scheme do not support this feature. Our scheme supports
uniqueness and user anonymity properties while Li–Hwang’s
scheme, Li et al.’s scheme, Das’s scheme and An’s scheme do
not provide these properties. In addition, our scheme is secure
against all possible known attacks including the security weak-
nesses found in An’s scheme and other schemes. Further, our
scheme is provably secure whereas other schemes are not prov-
ably secure. Li–Hwang’s scheme, Li et al.’s scheme, Das’s
scheme, and An’s scheme do not prevent insider attack,
whereas our scheme is secure against such attack. In our
scheme and Li et al.’s scheme, after successful mutual
authentication, both the user Ui and the server Sj establish a
secret session key shared between them so that they can
communicate securely using that established session key. In
other schemes, after mutual authentication, both the user Ui
and the server Sj do not establish a secret session key shared
between them. In summary, our scheme provides all the func-
tionality requirements listed in Table 7 as compared to other
related schemes, such as our scheme does not contain any ﬂaws
in the login and authentication phase as well as the password
change phase, and our scheme resists privileged insider attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, stolen smart card attack, imperson-
ation attack, ofﬂine attack, DoS attack, replay attack. In addi-
tion, our scheme always provides proper authentication,
establishes a secret session key between Ui and Sj after success-
ful authentication, provides formal security veriﬁcation using
the widely-accepted AVISPA tool, supports user anonymity
property and user auditing property, and also provides unique-
ness property. As a result, considering the functionality and
security services provided by our scheme, our scheme is much
better than other existing schemes.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the recently proposed An’s
scheme and shown that An’s scheme has several security weak-
nesses. We have proposed a new robust and secure efﬁcient
biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using
smart cards to withstand the security ﬂaws found in An’s
scheme. Compared to An’s scheme, our scheme supports efﬁ-
ciently the changing of user’s password locally and correctly
at any time by the user without contacting the remote server,
uniqueness and anonymity preserving properties, and strong
replay attack protection. Through the informal and formal
security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against
all possible known attacks including the attacks found in
An’s scheme. The simulation results of our scheme using the
widely-accepted AVISPA tool ensure that our scheme is secure
against passive and active attacks. Hence, higher security and
low communication and computational costs make our scheme
much appropriate for practical applications.
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